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Abstract
This article estimates a general credit risk model with both macroeconomic and latent credit 
factors for Spanish banks during the period 2004-2010. The proposed framework allows to 
estimate with bank level data both the standard credit risk model of Basel II and generalized 
models. I fi nd evidence of persistence in the credit latent factor and of a signifi cant effect of 
GDP growth and interbank rates on loan default rates. The estimated default correlation is 
low across specifi cations. The model is also used to calculate the impact on the probabilities 
of default of stressed economic scenarios.
Keywords: credit risk, default correlation, stress test, state space model, bootstrap, MLE.
JEL classifi cation: E0, G21.
Resumen
Este artículo estima un modelo general de riesgo de crédito que incluye tanto factores 
macroeconómicos como factores de crédito latentes para los bancos españoles durante 
el período 2004-2010. El marco propuesto permite la estimación con datos de bancos 
individuales tanto del modelo de crédito estándar de Basilea II como de modelos más 
generales. Se encuentra evidencia de un factor de crédito latente persistente y de un 
efecto signifi cativo del crecimiento del PIB y de los tipos de préstamo interbancarios 
en la tasa de impago. La estimación de la correlación entre impagos es baja para las 
distintas especifi caciones, lo que indica una relación positiva entre concentración bancaria 
y estabilidad fi nanciera. Se utiliza el modelo para calcular el impacto en las probabilidades 
de impago de distintos escenarios económicos estresados.
Palabras clave: riesgo de crédito, correlación de impagos, test de estrés, modelo de 
espacio de estados, bootstrap, estimación por máxima verosimilitud.
Códigos JEL: E0, G21.
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1 Introduction
The correct modeling of the factors determining credit default is crucial to ascertain the stability
of a financial system, as recognized in the international regulatory framework of Basel II.1
This article estimates a model of credit default with bank level data that allows to separate
the effects of system-wide variables, macroeconomic shocks and common latent factors, and
individual bank characteristics and loan rate policies. The risk model of Vasicek (2002) with
an independent single risk factor provides the basis for the evaluation of credit risk and capital
requirements in the framework of Basel II.2 The framework in this article can be used to estimate
the model of Vasicek (2002), and it can also incorporate autocorrelation in the risk factor and
multiple risk factors. Additionally, the use of bank level data allows to estimate default rates
for each institution rather than using only aggregate estimates for different credit portfolios
-loans to non financial firms, mortgages and personal loans. The control for individual bank
characteristics can also produce more precise estimates of the correlation of default events across
individual loans.
I estimate the latent factor model with the quasi maximum likelihood method, QML hence-
forth, applied to a panel of representative Spanish banks for every quarter during the period
January 2004-June 2010. The use of the Kalman filter and the state space representation of the
default processes allows me to introduce latent factors, with either i.i.d. or AR(1) dynamics,
and exogenous explanatory variables such as GDP growth and interbank rates that extend the
standard credit model of Basel II. The autoregressive dynamics and the impact of the macro-
economic variables is found to be significant, pointing to the advantages of generalizing the
standard credit model. Furthermore, the impact of latent factors and the correlation of default
across loans are estimated to be lower when these generalizations are incorporated into the
model. On the other hand, the shift to a two-factor model does not seem to have an important
impact on estimated correlation.
1I refer throughout the document to the regulatory structure for International Convergence of Capital Mea-
surement and Capital Standards of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2004) as Basel II.
2See also Gordy (2003) for an analysis of the application of Vasicek (2002) to internal ratings models.
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rely on the assumption of perfect correlation of defaults. This latter article also shows that, with
the credit risk model of Vasicek (2002), the relation between competition and bank failure is a
function of the correlation of defaults.3 The current article can provide estimates of the credit
risk correlation parameter in the credit model of Vasicek (2002), and in more general credit
risk models, and provides a basis to form an empirical evaluation of the effect of competition
on financial stability based on the theory models above.4
From a regulatory perspective, this article presents a flexible framework that allows to
perform stress tests for individual institutions and for system-wide credit portfolios of business
loans, mortgages and personal loans. The model includes GDP growth and the interbank rate
as explanatory variables and it is possible to study the sensitivity of default rates to adverse
macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the inclusion of latent credit factors allows to stress the
credit portfolio with negative realizations of these unobserved factors. The estimation of the
model with the actual credit performance data of the banks and, particularly, the performance of
retail mortgages and personal loans, potentially improves the precision of the stress test exercise
with respect to credit models that rely on market data of defaults of corporate portfolios.
The credit performance of the Spanish financial system has been studied in a number of
articles. The current work is closest to Jimenez and Mencia (2009), who estimate a model with
macroeconomic and latent factors for default rates and credit exposures at the industry sector
The credit model is not only useful to form estimates of default rates at a given point in
time, but also to evaluate the sensitivity of financial stability to changes in the structure of
the financial system. There has been recent theoretical interest in the effects of competition
on the probability of bank failure. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) introduce a credit model with
borrower moral hazard in the tradition of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in which more intense bank
competition reduces the probability of bank failure. In this model, the lower loan rates with
more bank competition induce borrowers to behave more prudently and induce lower default
rates. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show that the results in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)
3The relation between competition and bank risk taking has been also studied in Chiappori et al. (1995),
Hellmann et al.(2000), Matutes and Vives (2000) and Repullo (2004).
4Acharya (2009) evaluates bank closure policy and capital requirements in a duopoly model in which banks
choose credit correlation. The credit risk model differs from the framework in this article, but it is still an
additional example of the importance of credit correlation for prudential regulation.
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the use of credit lines and the borrower credit performance. Rodriguez and Trucharte (2007)
estimate a logistic model of credit default for the mortgage portfolio and apply it to perform
a stress test with a non-parametric approach. The current article uses data at the bank level
of loans to both non financial firms and households and it incorporates the effect of individual
bank characteristics on credit performance.
There is an scarcity of articles that estimate the parameters in the credit risk model in
Basel II from loan default data. Kupiec (2009) introduces a fixed effect linear estimator for the
credit parameters of the Basel II credit framework and he considers the effect on estimation
bias of autocorrelation in the single credit factor. Following Kupiec (2009), I estimate directly
the credit model parameters, but I use the Kalman filter to control for possibly autocorrelated
common latent factors rather than using fixed time effects. As in Jimenez and Mencia (2009), I
use data on loan defaults, whereas Kupiec (2009) uses data on the defaults of corporate bonds.5
Differently from Jimenez and Mencia (2009), I use bank level portfolios rather than aggregate
industry portfolios and I study explicitly the standard Basel II credit model. Alternative
approaches that calibrate the correlation parameter of Basel II from stock return data, e.g.,
Lopez (2004), are limited to use the exposures of listed companies.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model of default behaviour.
Section 3 describes the dataset and provides preliminary descriptive analysis. Section 4 details
the estimation methodology. Section 5 presents the main results and analyzes the sensitivity
of default to macroeconomic variables and bank loan rates. Section 6 concludes.
level -agriculture, manufacturing, mortgages, etc. Jimenez and Mencia (2009) contribute to
this literature with the introduction of unobserved latent factors in a model of credit risk with
loan data and find that the persistency of latent factors affects the distribution of default rates.
Jimenez and Saurina (2006) find evidence of a lagged positive relation between credit growth
and credit losses in the Spanish banking sector. Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) focus on
financial loans to firms and study the determinants of the use of collateral and the relation of
these guarantees and credit risk. Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) study the relation between
5The defaults of corporate U.S bonds have been thoroughly analyzed. Recently, Duffie at al. (2009) find that
the addition of a second factor in a continuous-time latent factor model is necessary to control for correlation
in corporate bond defaults.
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latent factors. The observed variables include the time-invariant effects of bank organization
fj and the risk class of the loan contract fr, the bank level average loan rate rjrt−s at date
t− s, with s > 0, and the macroeconomic factors in the (M ×1) vectorMt. Unobserved factors
include L time-variant common latent factors ξt and an idiosyncratic random component εijrt.
The default happens if the latent random variable dijrt takes a value such that dijrt < 0, where
dijrt is defined as:
dijrt = fj + fr + γ · rjrt−s + ρM ·Mt + ρξ,r · ξt + ρε · εijrt
where ρM and ρξ,r are respectively (1×M) and (1 × L) vectors of coefficients and {γ, ρε} are
real scalars. The random variables ξt and εijrt are independently distributed. The idiosyncratic
components εijrt are standard normal i.i.d. across borrowers, banks, risk classes and time. The
time-variant common latent factors ξt are assumed to follow a first order covariance-stationary
process with a conditional normal distribution:
ξt+1 = F · ξt + vt
where F is a (L × L) matrix of coefficients for the first-order dynamics and vt is a random
vector with normal distribution N(0,Σv), where Σv is a (L× L) variance-covariance matrix.
The probability of default Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt) of a borrower i in risk class r and bank j condi-
tional on the non-idiosyncratic factors in (fj, fr, rjrt−s, Mt, ξt) is given by:
Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt) = Φ

−(fj + fr)
ρε
− γ
ρε
· rjrt−s − ρMρε
·Mt −
ρξ,r
ρε
· ξt

(1)
2 Model
2.1 Model of Default Behaviour
The event of default at date t of a borrower i in a loan contract of risk class r that was granted
by a bank j is driven by observed macroeconomic and bank-specific variables and unobserved
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linear function of the factors (fj, fr, rjrt−s, Mt, ξt):
y∗jrt = f
∗
j + f
∗
r + γ
∗ · rjrt−s + ρ∗M ·Mt + ρ∗ξ,r · ξt (2)
where y∗jrt denotes the transformed probability Φ
−1(Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt)), f ∗j = −fj/ρε, f ∗r = −fr/ρε,
γ∗ = −γ/ρε , ρ∗M = −ρM/ρε and ρ∗ξ,r = −ρξ,r/ρε.
2.2 Empirical Specification
The default rates transformed by the inverse operator Φ−1() can be collected into a (J · 4× 1)
vector y∗t , where J is the number of banks in the sample and 4 is the number of risk classes:
loans to non financial firms (NFFs henceforth) with notional amount above 1 million euros
(r = 1), loans to NFFs with notional amount below 1 million euros (r = 2), mortgages (r = 3)
and personal loans (r = 4). The time-invariant fixed effects for bank and risk class are also
collected into a (J · 4× 1) vector f∗ ≡ (f ∗11, f∗12, f∗13, f∗14, ..., f ∗jr, ..., f ∗J4)T , with the entry for bank
j and risk class r equal to f ∗jr = f
∗
j + f
∗
r . The lagged loan rates are also collected into (J · 4× 1)
vector rt−s ≡ (r11t−s, r12t−s, r13t−s, r14t−s, ..., rjrt−s, ..., rJ4t−s)T . The model in (2) can then be
expressed at each time t as a vector equation:
y∗t = f
∗ + γ∗ · rt−s + βM ·Mt + βξ · ξt
where βM and βξ are respectively (J · 4 ×M) and (J · 4 × L) matrices that stack vertically
copies of ρ∗M and ρ∗ξ,r. More precisely,
βM = 1J ·4 ⊗ ρ∗M ; βξ = 1J ⊗
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρ∗ξ,1
ρ∗ξ,2
ρ∗ξ,3
ρ∗ξ,4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where ιt indicates knowledge of the set of conditioning variables (fj, fr, rjrt−s, Mt, ξt) at time t
and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, c.d.f. henceforth. It is therefore
possible to write the probability of default transformed by the inverse of the normal c.d.f. as a
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where 1J ·4 and 1J are column vectors of ones with dimensions (J · 4 × 1) and (J × 1), and ⊗
denotes the Kronecker product.
In order to obtain a default model that can be estimated, I introduce assumptions on the
distribution of measurement error as in Kupiec (2009). In particular, I assume that the observed
transformed default rates yt are equal to the sum of the model prediction y∗t and a (J · 4 × 1)
vector of measurement errors ηt, i. e., yt = y∗t + ηt. The terms in vector ηt are distributed as
independent normal variables with homoscedastic variance covariance Ση. In particular, the
vector ηt is independent of the latent credit risk factors ξt. The state-space representation of
the default model is then:
yt = f
∗ + γ∗ · rt−s + βM ·Mt + βξ · ξt + ηt (3)
ξt+1 = F · ξt + vt
ηt ∼ N(0,Ση), vt ∼ N(0,Σv)
This general model can be adapted to the standard credit risk framework in Basel II reg-
ulation and it can also be used to estimate specifications with correlation across time in the
common latent factor and multiple latent factors. I detail next the main specifications used in
the article.
2.2.1 Basel II Single Factor Default Risk Model
The model in Vasicek (2002) contains a single common latent factor ξt, which is distributed
as a standard normal random variable and it is i.i.d. across time. In the model in (3), the
restrictions F = 0 and Σv = σv = 1 are necessary to obtain the single factor model of Vasicek
(2002). Additionally, the model restricts the variables ξt and εijrt to mix into a standard normal
variable, ρε =
√
1− ρ and ρξ,r =
√ρ for all risk classes r with ρ ∈ (0, 1). This simple structure
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default in risk class r for bank j with no information on ξt is:
Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt−1) = Φ(−fj − fr − γ · rjrt−s − ρM ·Mt) (4)
where ιt−1 ≡ (fj, fr, rjrt−s,Mt, ξt−1). The i.i.d. assumption on the common latent factor implies
that knowledge of ξt−1 brings no information about ξt, and Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt−1) is conditioned only
on the fixed-effects, loan rate rjrt−s and macroeconomic factors in equation (4).
2.2.2 Single Factor Default Risk Model with Autocorrelation
It is straightforward to modify the model in Vasicek (2002) to allow for serial correlation
in the common latent factor. In the model (3), a single common latent factor ξt with an
AR(1) process requires the restrictions F ∈ (−1, 1) and Σv = σv = 1. This specification
still restricts the variables of ξt and εijrt to mix into a normal variable, ρε =
√
1− ρ and
ρξ,r =
√ρ for all risk classes r with ρ ∈ (0, 1), as in the credit risk model of Vasicek (2002).
The AR(1) process of ξt implies that the expectation of latent factors condtional on ιt−1 is
E[
√ρξt +
√
1− ρεijrt|ιt−1] = √ρ · F · ξt−1 rather than the unconditional zero expectation. The
probability of default with no information on ξt is then:
Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt−1) = Φ(−fj − fr − γ · rjrt−s − ρM ·Mt −
√
ρ · F · ξt−1) (5)
This follows from the fact that knowledge of ξt−1 makes the term F · ξt−1 fixed in ξt =
F · ξt−1 + vt, but the innovation error vt still mixes into a standard normal variable with the
idiosyncratic error εijrt. It is then the case that Pr(dijrt < 0|ιt−1) = Pr(√ρvt +
√
1− ρεijrt <
−fj−fr−γ ·rjrt−s−ρM ·Mt−√ρ·F ·ξt−1) and the expression in (5) follows. This same reasoning
implies that the correlation of default events conditional on ιt−1 ≡ (fj, fr, rjrt−s,Mt, ξt−1) is still
ρ.6
6The unconditional (on ξt) correlation across defaults of borrowers i and i is defined by Corr(dijrt, di?jrt) =
1/[1 + (1 − ρ)(1 − F 2)/ρ]. I focus on conditional correlation throughout the article, assuming that ιt−1 is the
relevant information set for banks at t.
implies that the correlation between two default events is ρ. In this model, the probability of
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2.2.3 Two-Factor Default Risk Model
I adapt the general specification of the model to allow for a common latent factor and a specific
latent factor driving the defaults in the NFFs sectors (r = 1 and r = 2). In the transition
equation in (3), ξt is a (2× 1) vector and each component of ξt follows an independent AR(1)
process with a standard normal innovation shock. This specification implies that Σv is restricted
to a (2× 2) identity matrix and F is given by:
F =
⎡
⎢⎣
F1 0
0 F2
⎤
⎥⎦
where {F1, F2} denote the autoregressive coefficients for each risk factor. In the measurement
equation, the term ρε is assumed positive, ρε > 0, and the vectors {ρξ,r}Rr=1 have positive
loading on the common and specific latent factor. In a vertical stack of {ρξ,r}Rr=1, the restricted
specification is: ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρξ,1
ρξ,2
ρξ,3
ρξ,4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρξ ρΔξ
ρξ ρΔξ
ρξ 0
ρξ 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where both ρξ and ρΔξ are real positive scalars. The random components of the model still
combine into a normal random variable, but it is not generally standard. This fact does not
alter the interpretation of the model, but it complicates the calculation of the correlation of two
default events. If two loans of different borrowers (i 
= i) belong to risk classes r, r ∈ {1, 2},
the correlation of the default events of these two loans is:
Corr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) =
ρ2ξ + ρ2Δξ
ρ2ξ + ρ2Δξ + ρ2ε
(6)
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and r ∈ {3, 4}, the correlation of default events of these two loans is:
Corr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) =
ρ2ξ
ρ2ξ + ρ2Δξ + ρ2ε

ρ2ξ + ρ2ε
(7)
As the variable εijrt is still a standard normal, the expression in (1) for the conditional
probability of default and the use of the inversion Φ(.)−1 in (2) are still valid.
3 Data set
3.1 Default Rates
I use data from the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain , CR henceforth, to calculate the
default rate at the individual bank level for four different risk classes: loans to NFFs with
notional amount above 1 million euros, loans to NFFs with notional amount below 1 million
euros, mortgage loans to households and personal loans with no collateral.7 This database
records quarterly information about all the loans granted by credit institutions in Spain with
notional amounts above 6,000 EUR. The information on the CR regarding the default status
of individual loans is used to form an average default rate for each risk class and each bank at
the end of every quarter during the period January 2004-June 2010.8
Table 1 and Figure 1 report information on the cross-sectional average of default rates for
each risk class. The advent of the financial crisis in 2008 leads to an increase in the average
default rates of all risk classes, and this evolution of the default rate series suggests the presence
of common risk factors that affect all banks and risk classes. However, it is also important to
notice that the differences in default rates across credit categories increase as the financial crisis
persists in years 2009 and 2010. For example, the difference in the average default rate of
mortgages and personal loans was approximately 85bp on the first quarter of 2004, whereas it
For r, r ∈ {3, 4}, the analogous expression to equation (6) isCorr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) = ρ2ξ/(ρ2ξ+
ρ2ε). If two loans belong to different borrowers (i 
= i) and risk classes (r 
= r) with r ∈ {1, 2}
claims to 336bp on the second quarter of 2010.
7Loans to non financial firms of all sizes include exposures to real estate development and construction firms.
8The determination of default status in the CR follows the Basel II definition for default events, i. e.,
obligations that are past due more than 90 days, or those that are considered to be highly unlikely to be repaid.
For more information, see Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2006), paragraphs 452-453, page 100.
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I report the cross-sectional coefficient of variation for every quarter and each separate risk
class in Table 2 and Figure 2. This statistic reveals a decrease in the cross sectional dispersion
in the crisis period starting in 2008. The coefficients of variation for the loans to NFFs above 1
million euros and the mortgage categories are quite stable, but the coefficients of variation for
the loans to NFFs below 1 million euros and personal loans decrease respectively by 60% and
40% from March 2004 to June 2010.
Figure 3 presents selected percentiles of the cross sectional distribution of default rates at
different quarters and reveals a widening of this distribution. In particular, there is an increase
in the difference between the average probability of default of the banks in the median and the
90th percentile. This increase is particularly large for the loans to NFFs above 1 million euros,
with a shift from a difference of 1.9% in March 2004 to 15.9% in June 2010, but it applies
to all risk classes. The average cross sectional dispersion presented in Table 2 and Figure 2
decreases over time, but the extreme of the distribution diverges from its median in the period
of financial crisis initiated in 2008. This evolution of the distribution of default rates highlights
the potential importance of bank specific characteristics beyond common factors to explain the
evolution of default rates.
3.2 Loan Rates and Macroeconomic Variables
The regulations of the Bank of Spain, in accordance with European Union Directives, require
banks to report the average interest rate and volume of new loans and deposits to the Bank
of Spain with a monthly frequency.9 I aggregate this information to a quarterly frequency and
into four risk classes of loans: loans to NFFs with notional amounts above 1 million euros,
loans to NFFs with notional amounts below 1 million euros, mortgage loans to households and
9The information requirements on interest rate reporting can be found in the Bank of Spain order 1/2010
published in BOE (2010), in accordance with the European Central Bank Regulations (CE) 290/2009. Banks
with assets in excess of 1,500 million euros and euro denominated deposits in excess of 500 million euros are
required to report interest rates. The Bank of Spain can also require interest rate information to banks that do
not satisfy this threshold.
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other loans to households.10 The quarterly weighted average interest rates for each risk class
and bank are calculated with the volume of new loans as weights.
I obtain the annual GDP growth at the end of each quarter from the Quarterly Spanish
National Accounts elaborated by the National Institute of Statistics. The most common inter-
bank reference rate for Spanish Banks is the Euribor 12 months, which is recovered from the
Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain. The sample period contains very different economic
scenarios with high growth in the early years and stagnant and negative growth rates after 2008.
There is also significant variation in the interbank reference rate during the sample period with
a minimum of 1.2% and a maximum of 5.4%. I report the summary statistics of the interest
rate and macroeconomic variables in Table 3.
4 Estimation
4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
I estimate the parameters Θ ≡ (f ∗r , f∗j , γ∗, F, βM , βξ,Ση,Σv) in the different specifications of
the default risk model in Section 2 with the maximum likelihood method.11 The Kalman filter
is used to control for the presence of common latent factors ξt with possible autocorrelation.
The Kalman filter recovers the latent factor series {ξt}Tt=1 given an evaluation of parameters Θ
with a series of linear forecasts {ξt+1|t}Tt=1:
ξt+1|t = F · ξt|t−1 + F · Pt|t−1 · βTξ (βξ · Pt|t−1 · βTξ + Ση)−1ηt (8)
where the superindex T indicates the transpose of a matrix, ηt = yt− f ∗− γ∗ · rt−s−βM ·Mt−
βξ ·ξt|t−1, ξt+1|t is the best forecast of ξt+1 based on a linear function of yt, f ∗, rt−s, Mt and all
10The interest rate on other loans to households serves as a proxy for the rates on personal loans, as it weights
the interest rates on consumer loans and other loans to households with no mortgage guarantees.
11The application of maximum likelihood estimation with Kalman filtering follows the presentation of Chapter
13 of Hamilton (1994).
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linear forecast of ξt|t−1. For a generic date t, the mean squared error of forecast ξt+1|t is:
Pt+1|t = (F −Kt · βξ)Pt|t−1(F T − βTξ ·KTt ) +Kt · Ση ·KTt + Σv (9)
where the term Kt is defined by:
Kt = F · Pt|t−1 · βTξ (βξ · Pt|t−1 · βTξ + Ση)−1
The procedure outlined in (8) and (9) requires starting values for ξ1|0 and P1|0 and I use
the unconditional mean E[ξt] and variance E{[ξt −E(ξt)][ξt −E(ξt)]T} of ξt to derive ξ1|0 = 0
and P1|0 = Σξ with Σξ defined by Σξ = F · Σξ · F T + Σv. The forecasts {ξ2|1, P2|1,ξ3|1, P3|1, ...}
are then obtained with recursive application of equations (8) and (9). Given the state-space
representation in (3), the conditional density function of yt at a time t is:
φyt|Θ,rt−s,Mt,yt−1(yt|Θ, rt−s,Mt, yt−1) =
(2π)−J ·4|βξ · Pt|t−1 · βTξ + Ση|−1/2
× exp{−1
2
(yt − f ∗ − γ∗ · rt−s − βM ·Mt − βξ · ξt|t−1)T × (βξ · Pt|t−1 · βTξ + Ση)−1
× (yt − f ∗ − γ∗ · rt−s − βM ·Mt − βξ · ξt|t−1)}
The log likelihood function for a sample with a number of periods T is then calculated as:
T
t=1
log φyt|Θ,rt−s,Mt,yt−1(yt|Θ, rt−s,Mt, yt−1) (10)
and the maximum likelihood estimator Θmaximizes the function in (10) subject to identification
restrictions. It is not possible to identify separately the scale and signs of the latent factors
and the factor loadings βξ. I then normalize the scale of Συ to unity and restrict βξ to have
a negative sign. As indicated in Section 2, the factors ξ are assumed to follow a covariance
stationary process and the restrictions F = 0 and F ∈ (−1, 1) are added to the specifications
preceding lags of yt: yt−1, yt−2, etc. The element Pt|t−1 is the mean squared error of the best
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with i.i.d. and AR(1) dynamics. The estimates of the parameters βξ can be used to measure
the correlation between default events in the different models.
Single Factor Default Risk Models
In this base specification in line with Vasicek (2002), the estimated parameter βξ on the
common temporal effect provides an estimate of βξ = −
√ρ/
√
1− ρ. It is then possible to
recover an estimate of ρ from β2ξ = ρ/1− ρ. The estimated ρ is:
ρ = β2ξ/(1 + β
2
ξ) (11)
The autocorrelation in the factor ξt does not alter the fact that βξ provides an estimate
of −√ρ/
√
1− ρ and we can still obtain ρ with equation (11) for specifications with an AR(1)
process for the common latent factor ξt.
Two-Factor Default Risk Model
The estimation of credit correlation is complicated by the presence of multiple factors, but
it is possible to use equations (6) and (7) to recover the correlation of default events across
households and NFFs. For the specification in subsection 2.2.3, a row of βξ corresponding
to risk class r will be defined as βξ,r = −ρξ,r/ρε = [−ρξ/ρε − ρΔξ/ρε] for r ∈ {1, 2} and
βξ,r = [−ρξ/ρε 0] for r ∈ {3, 4}. The terms ρ2ξ/ρ2ε and ρ2Δξ/ρ2ε are then identified from squaring
each of the components of βξ,r. It is not necessary to identify separately ρξ,r and ρε to pin down
the correlation across risk classes. For r, r ∈ {1, 2} and i 
= i, it is possible to divide numerator
and denominator in (6) by ρ2ε and obtain:
Corr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) =
ρ2ξ/ρ2ε + ρ2Δξ/ρ2ε
ρ2ξ/ρ2ε + ρ2Δξ/ρ2ε + 1
(12)
where all the terms can be estimated from βξ,r.
For r, r ∈ {3, 4}, the division by ρ2ε yields Corr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) = (ρ2ξ/ρ2ε)/(ρ2ξ/ρ2ε + 1),
which for ρ2ε = 1− ρ = 1− ρ2ξ would yield the same correlation as in the standard single factor
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r ∈ {3, 4}, the normalization of (7) by ρ2ε still allows to estimate correlation:
Corr(dijrt, dijrt|ιt−1) =
ρ2ξ/ρ2ε
(1/ρ2ε) ·

ρ2ξ + ρ2Δξ + ρ2ε

ρ2ξ + ρ2ε
(13)
=
ρ2ξ/ρ2ε
ρ2ξ/ρ2ε + ρ2Δξ/ρ2ε + 1

ρ2ξ/ρ2ε + 1
4.2 Inference
The asymptotic results for the variance covariance matrix of the estimated Θ for a large time
series are well known. In particular, the robust QML variance covariance estimate is defined
by:12
ΣQML =
1
T
·

ζH(Θ) · ζO(Θ)−1 · ζH(Θ)T
−1
(14)
where the estimates of the Hessian ζH(Θ) and outer product estimate of ζO(Θ) of the log
likelihood function with respect to parameters are given by:
ζH(Θ) = −
1
T
T
t=1
∂2 log φyt|Θ,rt−s,Mt,yt−1(Θ, .)
∂Θ∂ΘT
ζO(Θ) =
1
T
T
t=1

∂ log φyt|Θ,rt−s,Mt,yt−1(Θ, .)
∂Θ

·

∂ log φyt|Θ,rt−s,Mt,yt−1(Θ, .)
∂Θ
T
The estimate ΣQML allows to infer the asymptotic variance of ρ with a simple application of
the delta method. For example, the one factor models imply that ∂ρ/∂βξ = 2βξ/(1 + βξ)2 and
the standard error is then σ(ρ) = 2βξ · σ(βξ)/(1 + β
2
ξ)
2. An analogous calculation is completed
for the calculation of the standard error of the correlation in the two-factor model.
The relatively short horizon of the sample calls for caution in using the asymptotic times
series theory for the QML estimator. The analysis of dynamic factor models has been conducted
mostly in a time series framework with a fixed cross section and a large time dimension.13
12See Watson (1989) and Hamilton (1994) for asymptotic results. I compute the derivatives in
(14) with the numerical differentiation suite for Matlab R of John D’Errico, which is available at
http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral.
13The classic references in the field include Geweke (1977), Sargent and Sims (1977) and Stock and Watson
(1989). Hamilton (1994) provides a general exposition of this literature.
model. If two loans belong to different borrowers and risk classes (r 
= r) with r ∈ {1, 2} and
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However, there has been recent progress in the study of panel data sets with large cross sectional
and time dimensions. Bai and Ng (2002), Stock and Watson (2002) and Forni et al. (2000) use
principal components to estimate dynamic latent factor models with large panels. More closely
related to the current article, Doz et al. (2012) show the consistency of the QML estimator
of approximate factor models when both the cross section and time series dimension go to
infinity.14 Gagliardini an Gourieroux (2010) study the efficient estimation of large dynamic non
linear factor models. The concern over time series asymptotic results induce me to use non-
parametric bootstrap to obtain robust confidence intervals. The basic steps of the bootstrap
procedure are:
(1) Draw a random sample bs of the model variables {yt,bs, rt−s,bs,Mt,bs}t=1,...,T along the
cross sectional dimension j. Each bank observation in the artificial sample, containing the data
for all time periods and risk classes of bank j, is drawn with replacement from the original
sample of bank data.
(2) Compute the maximum likelihood estimator Θ(bs) through maximization of the log
likelihood function in (10) evaluated with the artificial sample data {yt,bs, rt−s,bs,Mt,bs}t=1,...,T .
(3) Repeat steps 1-2 a total number of BS = 250 times. Calculate the confidence intervals
for Θ from the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of maximum likelihood estimates
across artificial samples {Θ(bs)}bs=1,...,BS.
The bootstrap confidence intervals with cross-sectional resampling could also apply in the
case of a large scale latent factor model, with both large times series and cross sectional dimen-
sions, as in Doz et al. (2012). Kapetanios (2008) establishes the superiority of cross-sectional
resampling for a fixed-effect estimator in a class of common latent factor linear models. Tempo-
ral and block bootstrap sampling schemes could also be applied to obtain alternative estimates
of confidence intervals.
14Approximate factor models allow for cross sectional correlation of idiosyncratic components whereas an
exact factor model uses an i.i.d. assumption. Doz et al. (2012) use an exact factor model as proxy for an
approximate factor model and show that the bias introduced by approximation disappears asymptotically. The
results in Doz et al. (2012) apply to exact factor models as an special case.
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5 Results
5.1 Estimates with Average Default Rate Data
I estimate first the credit model with the average default rates for each class of risk (NFFs above
1 million euros, NFFs below 1 million euros, Mortgages and Personal Loans). The presentation
of the model estimates in Table 4 with average default rates allows to set up the framework for
presentation of results with a simple data set and provides a benchmark for the estimates with
bank level data. The base specification in column (a) includes an i.i.d. common latent factor
and fixed effects f ∗r for each class of risk. The risk factors {f ∗1 = −1.85, f∗2 = −1.70} associated
to loans with NFFs are greater than the risk factor f ∗4 = −2.29 associated to mortgages. Note
that the greater the estimate of f ∗r , the greater the probability of default in the formulas in
(1) and (4). This result is natural, as entrepreneurs and managers in control of NFFs enjoy
limited liability and have greater opportunities for risk-shifting than households with mortgage
loans. It is harder to predict a priori the relative size of the fixed effect for personal loans. I
find that f ∗3 = −1.97 resulting in higher average probability of default than in the mortgage
class, but still below the default rates in NFFs loans. The estimate of βξ implies a relatively
low correlation parameter ρ = 0.06.
The specification in column (b) of Table 4 allows for AR(1) dynamics and the common
latent factor is found to be highly autocorrelated, pointing to a limitation of the standard
credit risk model in the Basel II framework. This result is in line with the persistence of credit
risk factors in Jimenez and Mencía (2009) and the analysis in Kupiec (2009). The estimate
of βξ is much lower than in the base specification when persistence in the latent factor is
recognized and correlation decreases to ρ = 0.003. The specification in column (c) of Table
4 includes the second and third lags of GDP growth and the Euribor 12 months to control
for the macroeconomic environment, producing less persistent estimates of the latent credit
factor and low estimates of βξ and correlation ρ = 0.001. This result indicates that controlling
for macroeconomic factors reduces the importance of the common latent factor. As expected,
higher growth and lower interest rates are associated with lower default rates. The precision
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of the model estimates is high both according to the low QML standard errors and the narrow
confidence intervals calculated with bootstrap sampling across the time dimension.15 However,
the bootstrap confidence intervals do not allow to reject that the coefficients on the lags of the
Euribor 12 months are equal to zero.
5.2 Estimates with Bank Default Rate Data
The Table 5 contains the model estimates with individual bank level data of the specifications
used in Table 4 for aggregate data. The results on the fixed-effect of the risk class, macro-
economic factors and correlation are comparable in both tables, indicating that the use of
aggregate data, which is easier to collect and analyze, would be sufficient to estimate the most
basic specifications of the model in Section 2. However, the use of bank level data allows the
inclusion as explanatory variables of bank fixed effects f ∗j and the one year lag of the average
interest rate rjrt−4 (s = 4) charged by each bank on the loans of each risk class. A lagged rather
than a contemporaneous interest rate is used (s = 4) to recognize that newly granted loans do
not default immediately, but that credit problems are revealed over time.
The correlation parameter is still ρ ∼= 0.06 if an i.i.d. common latent factor is assumed,
and it decreases significantly if persistence in the latent factor or macroeconomic variables are
incorporated. As opposed to the estimation with aggregate data, the bootstrap confidence
interval for the lags of the Euribor 12 month excludes zero and I can reject a nihil impact of the
interbank rate. The coefficient on the interest rate lag rjrt−4 is positive and significant according
to QML standard errors. However, the bootstrap confidence interval on the coefficient on rjrt−4
is wide and it does not exclude the zero value. Variable loan rates referenced to the Euribor 12
months are common in the Spanish credit sector and the model estimates seem to indicate that
the interbank rate is more informative of the interest burden on borrowers than rjrt−4, which is
a proxy for the original interest rate on loan contracts. The bank level fixed effects improve the
fit of the model to the data and recognize that the identity of the bank (organizational structure,
15The bootstrap procedure across the time dimension t is analogous to the cross-sectional bootstrap described
in Section 4. In step (1), I draw time periods with replacement from the original sample, with each draw
containing the information of all risk classes at period t.
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risk management practices, etc.) has a differential impact on the probability of default of a
loan.
In Table 6, I present a selection of the model estimates with the two-factor model. The
columns (a) and (b) of Table 6 report the results for specifications with two latent factors with
i.i.d. and AR(1) dynamics and fixed-effects for the risk class. As in Tables 4 and 5, the impact of
the latent factor declines significantly with the AR(1) specification. The inclusion of the second
latent factor allows to estimate separate correlations for loans to NFFs and households, 0.055
and 0.049 respectively for the specification (a), but the results are not significantly different with
respect to the findings in the simpler single factor specification in Table 5. The specification (c)
includes the full set of macroeconomic and interest rate controls together with bank level fixed
effects and two i.d.d. latent factors. The explicit inclusion of the macroeconomic factors drains
again explanatory power from the credit latent factor model and the estimated correlation is
low, 0.007 and 0.002 and for NFFs and households. The correlation for NFFs in the model with
macroeconomic factors is higher than in the single factor specification, but it is still very low.
5.3 Model Implications for Regulatory Policy
The estimates for the standard credit risk model of Vasicek (2002) correspond with the results
for specification (a) in Table 5. For this model, the parameter ρ lies in the range [0.05, 0.07] and
points to reduced correlation across loan defaults. The inclusion of the AR(1) dynamics in the
common latent factor and macroeconomic variables further reduces the estimated correlation.
In the framework of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), low correlation implies a generally
positive relation between the number of competing banks and the probability of bank failure.16
The empirical results in this article indicate then that the theoretical results of Boyd and De
Nicolo (2005) would be of limited interest for the Spanish credit institutions during the period
of study. Given the low correlation, it would be expected that the reduction of the number
16The number of banks that minimizes the probability of bank failure with ρ < 0.1 is 1 for most of the
risk-shifting possibilities in the calibration considered in Martinez-Miera and Repullo(2010). See Figure 3 and
Figure 6 in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) for results with Cournot and circular city models.
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probability of bank failure.
The estimates of the credit model only provide an indication of how to apply the formal
models of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). The conclusions
of the combination of the credit model estimates and these theories must be examined with
care. For example, these models consider that banks choose the level of loanable funds they
provide in a single good Cournot framework, whereas the credit model considers four risk
classes and this opens the question of what would be the effect of low correlation in a formal
model in which banks choose the amount of credit provided to different sectors. Despite this
caveat, the estimated model provides a more informed estimate of correlation for the Spanish
financial system than simple calibrations or estimates based on aggregate market data for
listed institutions. This estimation contributes then to make a better judgement of the effects
of competition on the stability of the banking system.
5.4 Stress Tests for Individual Bank Loan Portfolios
I use the model to calculate the deterioration of default rates that results from an adverse
macroeconomic shock. The inclusion of the bank level loan rates in the model also allows to
check the sensitivity of individual bank default rates to the loan rate policies of different banks.
More specifically, I use the formula (1) to calculate the probability of default for each bank and
risk class for both a central scenario and multiple adverse scenarios. In the central scenario,
GDP growth and the Euribor 12 months are fixed at the mean values of 1.8% and 3.0% for
the period 2004-2010 and the latent factor is assumed equal to the unconditional mean value
ξt = 0. For the adverse scenarios, I consider a latent factor value of ξt = −2.3 that corresponds
with the 1% percentile of the unconditional distribution of this variable. The model estimates
indicate that high interbank rates and low GDP growth in the quarters preceding a given date
are associated with higher default rates. I use then in the adverse scenarios progressively higher
negative deviations of GDP growth , with a limit deviation of −4%, and positive deviations of
of competing banks through merger processes would both soften competition and reduce the
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the period average for each bank and risk class.
I report the change in the average probability of default of each risk class in Figure 4.
Confidentiality requirements do not allow to report the results at the bank level, but individual
estimates can be used for regulatory purposes. The pattern of responses of the probability of
default to the macroeconomic shocks is comparable across risk classes, with a mildly convex
relation between default rates and the shocks to GDP growth and the Euribor 12 months. For
example, the default rate for loans to NFFs above 1 million euros increases by 0.025 in the
[0, 1] scale when GDP growth and the Euribor 12 months deviate by −2% and 1% from their
period averages. Additional shocks of −2% and 1% to each of these macroeconomic variables
bring an increase in default rates of 0.0589 − 0.025 = 0.034. The levels of default rates in the
panels of Figure 4 are different across risk classes, with the lowest increase in default rates
corresponding to mortgages. The maximum variation of 0.04 in mortgage loans can however
generate substantial credit losses, as the exposure to this form of credit is large for Spanish
credit institutions.17
The Figure 5 reports the change in average default rates as response to a level increase in
all bank level loan rates above their period average values. This calculation is performed both
at the central scenario and at the most adverse scenario with GDP growth a 4% below average
and the Euribor 12 months 2% above average. This calculation could also be performed at the
individual bank level. In the range of loan rates used for the stress exercise, the relation between
probability of default and individual loan rates is approximately linear and increasing, and the
pattern of responses to macroeconomic shocks is again similar across risk classes. The range of
deviations above the period average for loan rates is relatively ample, with a maximum deviation
of +4%, but the implied maximum changes in default rates are moderate. For example, the
default rate of loans to NFFs below 1 million euros would increase by 0.003 with an increase
of 4% of bank loan rates in the central scenario and above 0.008 in the adverse scenario. This
low impact of loan rates on probability of default with respect to the macroeconomic variables
17The Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain reports in Section 4.14 an aggregate figure of 612,000 million
euros for the total household mortgages of credit institutions at year end 2010.
the Euribor 12 months, with a limit deviation of +2%. The bank level loan rates are fixed at
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follows from the low estimates of the coefficient on rt−s relative to the coefficients on the Euribor
12 months and GDP growth. To interpret these results, it must also be taken into account that
banks do not necessarily increase loan rates when macroeconomic forecasts are negative. Figure
5 provides sensitivity analysis rather than the impact on default rates of the expected changes
of loan rates in stressed macroeconomic scenarios.
6 Conclusion
This article has estimated the standard credit risk model of the Basel II framework with a
maximum likelihood methodology that controls for the latent common factor with the Kalman
filter. This approach allows to bring the standard credit model directly to credit data rather
than relying on market data for listed banks and corporations. This framework also allows to
estimate generalizations of the standard credit model with macroeconomic factors, autocorre-
lation in the latent credit risk factor and multiple factors with different effects on different loan
classes. The recognition of the persistence of the latent factor or the inclusion of lags of GDP
growth and interbank rates reduce the estimated correlation across loans with respect to the
standard credit risk model. For both regulators and banks, these results point to the importance
of evaluating the robustness to modelling assumptions of credit performance forecasts.
The model can be used to compute the probability of default of loans to non financial firms,
mortgages and personal loans under adverse macroeconomic scenarios and stressed values of
latent credit factors. I find a significant increase of default rates across all risk categories as
GDP growth and interbank rates deviate from their average values. An individual bank that
sets loan rates above average levels can expect moderate further deterioration of its credit
performance beyond the impact of macroeconomic shocks.
A key insight from the recent theoretical literature studying the relation between banking
competition and the probability of bank failure is that this relation is a function of credit risk
and, in particular, the correlation of defaults across loans. The empirical results in the article
point to relatively low correlation and suggest, in the light of the theoretical literature, that
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consolidation in the Spanish banking sector can improve financial stability. Additionally, the
empirical finding of persistence of credit factors and the differences of credit performance across
sectors suggests that it would be of interest to examine the relation between financial stability
and banking competition in these more general credit risk frameworks.
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Table 1 - Probability of default (Average, Cross-sectional Distribution)
200406 2.00% 3.27% 1.40% 0.54%
200412 1.76% 2.97% 1.31% 0.50%
200506 1.91% 2.99% 1.74% 0.78%
200512 1.87% 2.80% 1.67% 0.66%
200606 1.87% 2.76% 1.62% 0.65%
200612 1.83% 2.79% 1.69% 0.63%
200706 2.00% 2.85% 1.89% 0.75%
200712 2.19% 3.25% 2.03% 0.90%
200806 3.03% 4.18% 2.58% 1.33%
200812 5.78% 6.79% 3.63% 2.08%
200906 9.16% 10.17% 5.09% 2.76%
200912 9.69% 11.32% 5.44% 2.40%
201006 10.00% 12.49% 5.84% 2.48%
Date
Non Financial
Firms Above 1M
Non Financial
Firms Below 1M
Personal Mortgages
Note. This table reports at the end of each quarter in the sample period the cross-sectional
average of the probability of default for each of the risk classes of loan contracts: loans to
non financial firms above 1 million euros, loans to non financial firms below 1 million euros,
mortgages and personal loans. Loans to non financial firms of all sizes include exposures
to real estate development and construction firms.
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Table 2 - Probability of Default (Coefficient of Variation, Cross-sectional Distribution)
200406 0.90 0.77 0.80 0.70
200412 1.01 0.83 0.73 0.65
200506 1.02 0.75 0.62 0.61
200512 1.02 0.76 0.65 0.62
200606 0.97 0.71 0.58 0.63
200612 0.99 0.69 0.57 0.65
200706 1.00 0.65 0.58 0.70
200712 1.03 0.71 0.54 0.82
200806 0.85 0.61 0.54 0.87
200812 0.83 0.52 0.53 0.88
200906 0.76 0.44 0.51 0.74
200912 0.79 0.47 0.54 0.62
201006 0.84 0.45 0.53 0.60
Date
Non Financial
Firms Above 1M
Non Financial
Firms Below 1M
Personal Mortgages
Note. This table reports at the end of each quarter in the sample period the cross-
sectional coefficient of variation of the probability of default for each of the risk classes of
loan contracts: loans to non financial firms above 1 million euros, loans to non financial
firms below 1 million euros, mortgages and personal loans. Loans to non financial firms of
all sizes include exposures to real estate development and construction firms.
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Table 3 - Summary Statistics (Interest Rate and Macro Variables)
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Loan rates for Non Financial Firms 4.0 1.2 1.1 8.0
above 1 million euros
Loan rates for Non Financial Firms 4.6 1.1 1.8 7.5
below 1 million euros
Loan rates for Personal Loans 8.1 2.9 1.1 21.2
Loan rates for Mortgages 4.1 1.0 1.7 6.7
Euribor 12 Months 3.0 1.3 1.2 5.4
GDP Annual Growth Rate 1.8 2.8 -4.5 4.3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1305
Table 4 - Single Factor Risk Model with Aggregate Data
(a) (b) (c)
Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS)
F . . . . 0.9844 0.0067 *** 0.9643 0.9858 0.5093 0.2104 0.2933 0.9442
f
NFFs (> 1m eur) -1.8468 0.0619 *** -1.9364 -1.7540 -1.7370 0.2750 *** -1.7965 -1.7060 -1.9544 0.0433 *** -2.0253 -1.8721
NFFs(< 1m eur) -1.6964 0.0543 *** -1.7778 -1.6155 -1.5865 0.2705 *** -1.6349 -1.5664 -1.8040 0.0439 *** -1.8752 -1.7184
Personal -1.9717 0.0433 *** -2.0407 -1.9046 -1.8619 0.2730 *** -1.8964 -1.8584 -2.0793 0.0490 *** -2.1602 -1.9853
Mortgages -2.2999 0.0452 *** -2.3761 -2.2339 -2.1901 0.2756 *** -2.2315 -2.1780 -2.4075 0.0486 *** -2.4866 -2.3121
?GDP % (t-2) -0.0429 0.0161 *** -0.0834 -0.0086
?GDP % (t-3) -0.0565 0.0175 *** -0.0916 -0.0202
Euribor (t-2) 0.0466 0.0213 ** -0.0005 0.1146
Euribor (t-3) 0.0566 0.0258 ** -0.0215 0.1088
?? -0.2567 0.0253 *** -0.2852 -0.2060 -0.0554 0.0088 *** -0.0810 -0.0524 -0.0318 0.0066 *** -0.0344 -0.0146
?? 0.0037 0.0007 *** 0.0025 0.0045 0.0034 0.0006 *** 0.0022 0.0043 0.0036 0.0007 *** 0.0023 0.0044
log lk 88.4 124.6 134.7
? 0.0618 0.0114 *** 0.0407 0.0752 0.0031 0.0010 *** 0.0027 0.0065 0.0010 0.0004 ** 0.0002 0.0012
Observations 104 104 104
Periods 26 26 26
Note. (i) The specification (a) uses fixed effects f for each risk class and an i.i.d. common
latent factor (F = 0), specification (b) adds AR(1) dynamics to the common latent factor
(−1 < F < 1) and specification (c) adds two and three quarter lags of annual GDP growth
(ΔGDP %) and the interbank rate (Euribor) as exogenous explanatory variables to the
specification (b). The standard errors are calculated with the asymptotic QML formula in
equation (14) and confidence intervals, p5(BS) and p95(BS), are derived with bootstrap
sampling across the time dimension.
(ii) Significant coefficients with QML standard errors at the 10% (5%, 1%) are marked
with ∗(∗∗, ∗∗∗).
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Table 5 - Single Factor Risk Model with Bank Level Data
(a) (b) (c)
Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS)
F . . . . 0.9846 0.0072 *** 0.9812 0.9862 0.6158 0.1761 *** 0.5184 0.6852
f
NFFs (> 1m eur) -2.1237 0.0541 *** -2.2166 -2.0339 -2.0061 0.2798 *** -2.0972 -1.9138 -2.2737 0.0408 *** -2.3844 -2.1532
NFFs(< 1m eur) -1.7838 0.0502 *** -1.8242 -1.7419 -1.6662 0.2767 *** -1.7085 -1.6233 -1.9385 0.0429 *** -2.0183 -1.8603
Personal -2.0510 0.0371 *** -2.0933 -2.0098 -1.9334 0.2792 *** -1.9776 -1.8908 -2.2346 0.0479 *** -2.3915 -2.0832
Mortgages -2.4154 0.0378 *** -2.4740 -2.3600 -2.2978 0.2816 *** -2.3503 -2.2478 -2.5666 0.0466 *** -2.6494 -2.4790
?GDP % (t-2) -0.0484 0.0144 *** -0.0566 -0.0398
?GDP % (t-3) -0.0439 0.0149 *** -0.0492 -0.0369
Euribor (t-2) 0.0460 0.0183 ** 0.0352 0.0579
Euribor (t-3) 0.0604 0.0214 *** 0.0485 0.0726
r jrt-4 0.0088 0.0021
*** -0.0184 0.0351
Bank Fixed Effects        Yes        Yes          Yes
? ? -0.2498 0.0284
*** -0.2801 -0.2342 -0.0562 0.0092 *** -0.0628 -0.0542 -0.0308 0.0054 *** -0.0386 -0.0281
?? 0.1014 0.0045 *** 0.0881 0.1255 0.1013 0.0045 *** 0.0893 0.1257 0.1012 0.0045 *** 0.0897 0.1226
log lk -1488.6 -1454.2 -1438.8
? 0.0587 0.0126 *** 0.0520 0.0728 0.0031 0.0010 *** 0.0009 0.0003 *** 0.0008 0.0015
Observations 5408 5408 5408
Banks 52 52 52
Periods 26 26 26
Note. (i) The specification (a) uses fixed effects f for each risk class and individual bank,
and an i.i.d. common latent factor (F = 0), specification (b) adds AR(1) dynamics to
the common latent factor (−1 < F < 1) and specification (c) adds two and three quarter
lags of annual GDP growth (ΔGDP %) and the interbank rate (Euribor) together with
the one year lag of the interest rate of bank j on loans of class r (rjrt−4) as exogenous
explanatory variables to the specification (b). The standard errors are calculated with the
asymptotic QML formula in equation (14) and confidence intervals, p5(BS) and p95(BS),
are derived with bootstrap sampling across the cross sectional dimension j.
(ii) Significant coefficients with QML standard errors at the 10% (5%, 1%) are marked
with ∗(∗∗, ∗∗∗).
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Table 6 - Two-Factor Risk Model with Bank Level Data
(a) (b) (c)
Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS) Coefficient Sd Error p5(BS) p95(BS)
F . . . . 0.9844 0.0068 *** 0.9810 0.9862 . .
. . . . 0.9249 0.0286 *** 0.9100 0.9394 . .
f
NFFs (> 1m eur) -2.1170 0.0596 *** -2.2571 -1.9873 -1.9914 0.2726 *** -2.1019 -1.8512 -2.2858 0.0336 *** -2.3991 -2.1554
NFFs(< 1m eur) -1.7771 0.0545 *** -1.8358 -1.7202 -1.6514 0.2690 *** -1.7007 -1.5900 -1.9508 0.0347 *** -2.0434 -1.8606
Personal -2.0443 0.0435 *** -2.0846 -1.9997 -1.9726 0.2681 *** -2.0124 -1.9133 -2.2478 0.0393 *** -2.4061 -2.0812
Mortgages -2.4087 0.0449 *** -2.4799 -2.3516 -2.3371 0.2706 *** -2.4006 -2.2722 -2.5788 0.0391 *** -2.6730 -2.4821
?GDP % (t-2) -0.0485 0.0223 ** -0.0559 -0.0405
?GDP % (t-3) -0.0347 0.0227 -0.0411 -0.0276
Euribor (t-2) 0.0600 0.0253 ** 0.0484 0.0719
Euribor (t-3) 0.0431 0.0326 0.0314 0.0556
r jrt-4 0.0091 0.0018
*** -0.0202 0.0376
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes
? ?  -? ?/? ? -0.2278 0.0232 *** -0.2462 -0.2076 -0.0514 0.0080 *** -0.0558 -0.0482 -0.0398 0.0056 *** -0.0585 -0.0293
 -???/? ? -0.0756 0.0117 *** -0.0986 -0.0527 -0.0357 0.0037 *** -0.0422 -0.0304 -0.0730 0.0116 *** -0.1009 -0.0576
?? 0.1619 0.0050 *** 0.1156 0.2070 0.1614 0.0050 *** 0.1175 0.2110 0.0998 0.0042 *** 0.0886 0.1209
log lk -2710.0 -2666.3 -1423.3
Corr( r,r' in {1,2}) 0.0545 0.0107 *** 0.0472 0.0616 0.0039 0.0008 *** 0.0035 0.0046 0.0069 0.0016 *** 0.0045 0.0132
Corr( r,r' in {3,4}) 0.0493 0.0096 *** 0.0413 0.0571 0.0026 0.0003 *** 0.0023 0.0031 0.0016 0.0004 *** 0.0009 0.0034
Corr( r in {1,2}, r' in {3,4}) 0.0492 0.0095 *** 0.0412 0.0570 0.0026 0.0015 * 0.0023 0.0031 0.0016 0.0004 *** 0.0009 0.0034
Observations 5408 5408 5408
Banks 52 52 52
Periods 26 26 26
Note. (i) The specification (a) uses fixed effects f for each risk class and i.i.d. common
latent factors (F = 0), specification (b) adds AR(1) dynamics to the common latent factors
(−1 < F < 1) and specification (c) considers again i.i.d. common latent factors and adds
bank fixed effects, two and three quarter lags of annual GDP growth (ΔGDP %) and
the interbank rate (Euribor) together with the one year lag of the interest rate of bank
j on loans of class r (rjrt−4) as exogenous explanatory variables. The standard errors are
calculated with the QML formula in equation (14) and confidence intervals, p5(BS) and
p95(BS), are derived with bootstrap sampling across the cross sectional dimension j.
(ii) Significant coefficients with QML standard errors at the 10% (5%, 1%) are marked
with ∗(∗∗, ∗∗∗).
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Figure 1 - Probability of Default (Average)
Note. This figure plots the at the end of each quarter in the sample period the cross-
sectional average of the probability of default for each of the risk classes of loan contracts:
loans to non financial firms above 1 million euros, loans to non financial firms below 1
million euros, mortgages and personal loans. Loans to non financial firms of all sizes
include exposures to real estate development and construction firms.
Figure 2 - Probability of Default (Coefficient of Variation)
Note. This figure plots the at the end of each quarter in the sample period the cross-
sectional coefficient of variation of the probability of default for each of the risk classes of
loan contracts: loans to non financial firms above 1 million euros, loans to non financial
firms below 1 million euros, mortgages and personal loans. Loans to non financial firms of
all sizes include exposures to real estate development and construction firms.
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Figure 3 - Probability of Default (Cross Sectional Distribution)
Note. This figure plots at the end of each quarter in the sample period the 10th, 50th
and 90th percentiles (p10, p50, p90) in the cross-sectional distribution of the probability
of default for each of the risk classes of loan contracts: loans to non financial firms above
1 million euros, loans to non financial firms below 1 million euros, mortgages and personal
loans. Loans to non financial firms of all sizes include exposures to real estate development
and construction firms.
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Figure 4 - Impact of Adverse Macroeconomic and Credit Condititons on Default Rates
Note. This figure plots for each of the risk classes of loan contracts the variation in the
average probability of default in a quarter when moving from a central scenario (GDP
growth, Euribor 12 months and bank level loan rates equal to their time averages for the
period 2004-2010) to an adverse scenario (shocks to GDP growth in the range [0,−4%]
and shocks to the Euribor 12 months in the range [0, 2%]). Additionally, the common
latent factor switches from mean value (ξt = 0) in the central scenario to the adverse 1%
percentile (ξt = −2.3) in the adverse scenario.
The variation in the probability of default is calculated with equation (1) and presented in
the vertical axis in the [0, 1] scale, the scenario deviations from average GDP growth and
average Euribor 12 months are respectively presented on the right and left horizontal axis.
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Figure 5 - Impact of Individual Bank Loan Rates on Default Rates
Note. This figure plots for each of the risk classes of loan contracts the variation in the
average probability of default in a quarter as response to increases in the individual loan
rates above their average levels for the period 2004-2010. The variation of default rates
is calculated both for a central scenario (GDP growth, Euribor 12 months and bank level
loan rates equal to their time averages for the period 2004-2010) and an adverse scenario
(GDP growth and Euribor 12 months are respectively four percentage points below and two
percentage points above period average). Additionally, the common latent factor switches
from mean value (ξt = 0) in the central scenario to the adverse 1% percentile (ξt = −2.3)
in the adverse scenario.
The variation in the probability of default is calculated with equation (1) and presented
in the vertical axis in the [0, 1] scale, the paralell increments in the bank level loan rates
are presented in the horizontal axis.
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